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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP) has developed from a tentative approach to haz-
ard  identification for process plants in the early 1970s to an almost universally accepted
approach today, and a central technique of safety engineering. Techniques for automated
HAZOP analysis were developed in the 1970s, but still have not displaced expensive manual
approaches. Reasons for this were investigated and conclusions are drawn. The author’s
actual experience in applying automated HAZOP techniques over a period of more  than
30  years is revisited, including results from several full-scale validation studies and many
industrial applications. Automated techniques, when combined with manual approaches,
were found to provide significant improvements in HAZOP quality and a limited but valuable
improvement in efficiency.
© 2017 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1.  Introduction
Techniques for automated HAZOP analysis were described actually
before the concept of HAZOP was openly published. Fussell (1973)
described automated fault tree analysis by piecing together “mini fault
trees”, which provides a methodology for filling out the cause columns
of a HAZOP table. Taylor (1975) and Taylor and Hollo (1977) presented
algorithms for automated cause consequence analysis and fault tree
analysis, together with a systematic approach to component mod-
elling. Powers and Tompkins (1974a, 1974b), Powers and Lapp (1976) and
Lapp and Powers (1977a, 1977b) published methods for fault tree analy-
sis of chemical plant using signal directed graphs (digraphs), and Salem
et al. (1975, 1977, 1979) and Salem and Apostolakis (1980) described the
use of decision tables to support fault tree construction. Andow (1973)
used functional equations as a representation for disturbance propa-
gation in alarm analysis. Martin-Solis et al. (1977) and Poucet (1983)
used logical equations to represent alternative causes of disturbances.
Digraph models have similar power to mini-fault tree and state table
approaches, but require preparation of a digraph form the process dia-
gram such as a P&ID (Cui et al. introduced a method to make this
transformation automatically.
The RIKKE program, developed by the author and J.V. Olsen using
Fussel’s mini-fault tree approach, was extended to cover feed forward
and feedback loops. It was developed and validated by the expedient
of helping to build a chemical plant, comparing the automated results
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with several manual analyses, and by assisting in the commissioning
and operation (Taylor, 1982a, 1982b; Taylor and Olsen, 1983; Haastrup
et al., 1985).
Since then there have been many doctoral theses and journal arti-
cles describing automated fault tree and HAZOP analysis methods. Yet
there are still very few industrial applications of automated HAZOP,
and companies still invest tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars
in performing HAZOP manually in HAZOP workshops. Even worse, the
manually completed HAZOPs are known to be incomplete (see e.g. Tay-
lor, 2012). What went wrong? This paper discusses the development of
manual and automated HAZOP over a period of forty years, reasons for
the lack of success of automated HAZOP and reasons for the successes.
2.  Obstacles  to  automated  HAZOP
One of the first obstacles to the use of automated is the need
to translate system drawings such as piping and instrumen-
tation diagrams (P&IDs) into a special format. These can be
either a simplified version of the P&IDs themselves or a more
complex derived representations such as digraphs (e.g. Powers
and Lapp, 1976) or multi level flow diagrams (Öhman, 1999).
These derived representations proved to be complex and error
prone for large systems, and often more  costly than the man-
ual HAZOP itself. This problem has been solved in recent years
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by the development of software that can take commercial CAD
drawings and translate them into “intelligent” drawings which
can be used in accident simulation (Rossing et al., 2010). Cui
et al. (2008, 2010) developed a system which could take in a CD
piping and instrumentation drawing, convert it in a standard-
ised way to digraphs, and use these for HAZOP. It should be
noted that full commercial application requires not just trans-
lation of individual diagrams, but also integration of complete
sets of diagrams.
Some P&IDs include the control signal flow paths, but in
most cases safety and sequential control at least are described
by means of cause and effects matrices, so that for a full
analysis, these too must be integrated into the set of system
drawings.
Some disturbance identified by HAZOP require quantita-
tive judgements. An example from the plant shown in Fig. 6,
and which actually occurred, is the possibility of a product
freezing in a condenser, blocking the flow. This requires knowl-
edge about the temperature of the condenser coolant, the rate
of heat transfer from the product, and the product freezing
point. In a fully automated analysis, such judgements need to
be interpreted conservatively, which implies that the analyses
need to be reviewed after completion, in order to reject those
automated judgements which are incorrect.
Numerical judgements were found to be an issue in about
2% of the disturbances investigated in a total of 40 recent
manual HAZOPS studied. Some researchers have incorporated
numerical simulation into the automated HAZOP process so
that judgements can be made automatically, but this requires
a large additional effort unless a dynamic simulator is being
constructed as a part of the design process. Even then the
automated HAZOP software needs to be adapted to the specific
simulator used (e.g. McCoy et al., 1999).
There are also issues of confidence and trust in the use
of automated HAZOP. In modern practice the HAZOP work-
shop group has considerable authority and corresponding
responsibility. Recommendations take on the role of formal
and sometimes legal requirements, which must be imple-
mented unless the designer can provide counter arguments. If
a proposal is rejected then the designer is required to provide
alternative solutions to the problem or a careful demonstra-
tion that the problem involved is a minor one. In order to be
able to accept the responsibility for risk reduction recommen-
dations the HAZOP team requires full understanding of the
problems and the basis for analysis. This cannot be achieved
via a purely computer generated HAZOP.
Another problem observed from study of accident reports is
that there over 400 physical phenomena which have given rise
to accidents in oil, gas and chemical plant (Taylor, 2014). The
published automated methods have been observed to include
up to about 30 of the most common of these. As an example,
13 different forms of liquid hammer were identified from acci-
dent reports, and liquid hammer was found to have caused 2%
of the major accidents in refineries, yet these events could
not even be represented in the formalisations used in first
generation HAZOP methods. The automated methods based
on disturbance propagation describe typically 23 phenomena.
McCoy et al. (2000e) list 38 physical phenomena and in McCoy
et al. (2000b) 14 phenomena related to loss of containment
consequences. There does not appear to be any reason why
this work could not be extended to cover all the known phe-
nomena, but effort would be needed to ensure a practical level
of discrimination.
A further problem was revealed by a study of ten high
quality HAZOPS made from 2008 to 2014. About one third of
the findings and recommendations from these were found
to derive from drawing errors and detail design errors which
are not related to process deviations and are not amenable to
HAZOP analysis as described in guidelines. It is often said that
such problems should be dealt with by a preliminary design
review, but it was observed that many  detail design problems
can only be identified in the context of HAZOP. Examples are
choice of material for a pipe, when the pipe can be accidentally
subjected to low temperatures, or the decision about whether
a valve should be locked open. The issue of automated design
review is addressed below.
3.  Completeness  of  analyses
A good HAZOP should preferably identify all significant acci-
dent consequences and the majority of accident causes,
including all the cases which are likely to occur i.e. have
a significant risk contribution. Under ideal conditions, com-
pleteness is defined as (Taylor, 1981):
Absolute completeness = number of scenarios identified/
number of possible scenarios
Here scenarios are defined as an initiating event, a number of
safety barrier failures and a consequence event. Completeness
values depend on the degree of detail in the analysis, and all
assessments here are predicated on the typical level of detail
typical of professionally completed HAZOPS.
Completeness defined in this way has a problem in that the
number of possible scenarios cannot be determined. Historical
completeness is defined as:
Historical completeness = number of scenarios identified/
number of scenarios identified from an extensive
incident database
A database of over 1000 oil, gas and chemical industry acci-
dents was developed to support completeness assessments.
A more  valuable measure of completeness for hazard iden-
tification is to weight each accident scenario according to risk,
but this can only be made practical if the HAZOP event fre-
quencies and risk can be calculated easily (see third generation
methods below).
For automated HAZOP, another important measure is dis-
crimination, defined as:
Discrimination = number of realistically possible scenarios/
number of scenarios identified
Without care in discrimination the HAZOP becomes use-
less. For example historical completeness could be ensured
simply by incorporating all the scenarios from the database
(leaving the analyst with the task of reviewing the auto-
mated analysis and discarding most of it). On the other hand
fully automated analyses must compromise on discrimina-
tion because they must ensure that all scenarios which are in
principle possible must be included, and the basis for inclu-
sion may be uncertain. For example sump tank rupture due

